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1 Introduction
Structural unemployment differs tremendously among countries at relatively similar stages of
economic development. For instance, the 20 OECD member countries analyzed by Nickell and
Layard (1999) are characterized by an average unemployment rate over the period 1983 to
1996 of about 8 %; but the standard deviation in unemployment rates across these countries
amounts to more than 4 %. The literature on labor market institutions documents strong
differences in policies that appear to contribute to unemployment with unemployment insurance
being one of the most important candidate explanations. In particular, the potential duration
of unemployment benefits is strongly correlated with structural unemployment (Nickell and
Layard, 1999). The idea is that extended benefit duration discourages job search and thus leads
to prolonged unemployment duration.
This paper proposes to identify the causal effect of extending benefits on the duration of
job search using information on a unique policy change in Austria. In June 1988, the Austrian
government extended the potential duration of unemployment benefits from 30 weeks to 209
weeks for job seekers aged 50 or older when entering unemployment, living for at least 6 months in
certain regions of Austria, who satisfy a previous work requirement. There are several interesting
aspects of this regional extended benefit program (REBP). First, the REBP provides a unique
opportunity to study the effect of a dramatic increase in the potential benefit duration by almost
3.5 years. The existing literature on the effects of potential benefit duration on unemployment
duration are primarily based on extensions of benefit duration by one or two quarters.1
Second, the program is strictly targeted with respect to age at entry into unemployment
and place of residence – two dimensions that can be readily observed in the available data.
The age based identification strategy compares job seekers who are aged 50 years to job seekers
who just fail the age requirement. This strategy is intuitively appealing because both groups
of job seekers are basically of the same age. However, since the program was strictly applied
conditional on having completed the 50th year of age, the slightly older group of job seekers has
access to REBP whereas the slightly younger group of job seekers does not have access to REBP.
Thus assignment to treatment takes place in a so-called ”sharp” regression discontinuity design
(Hahn et al., 2001). One potentially important concern with this strategy is that firms and
workers could try to manipulate age at entry into unemployment. In particular, firms might be
willing to offer to their employees not to lay them off until they just satisfy the age requirement.2
1For instance, Katz and Meyer (1990) use state variation in federal supplementation of potential benefit
duration by one quarter (13 week) triggered by high unemployment. Lalive et al. (2006) study changes in
potential benefit duration in Austria by 9, and 22 weeks respectively.
2Such a reaction can invalidate the regression discontinuity assumption that average unemployment duration
for individuals just missing the age threshold is informative on the counterfactual duration without treatment for
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The paper therefore proposes to focus on the second threshold, the border between treated and
control regions, to identify the effect of REBP on unemployment duration. This geography based
strategy contrasts individuals living close to both sides of the border between treated and control
regions. This contrast is appealing because labor market conditions are quite similar within a
tightly defined geographical area. Moreover, in contrast to age at entry into unemployment,
region of residence can not be readily manipulated because workers have to move from control
to treated regions well in advance of the eventual layoff.
Third, Austrian social insurance legislation allows for early retirement at age 54 years for
unemployed women but only at age 59 years for unemployed men. This means that REBP can
also be used to study the interactions between unemployment insurance provisions and early re-
tirement rules. Specifically, by performing separate analyses for women and men, this paper can
discuss the likely impacts of having an early retirement option after exhausting unemployment
benefits among women compared to not having this option among men.
This paper contributes to two strands of the literature. The first strand is concerned with
measuring the effects of potential benefit duration on unemployment duration. A selective list
of contributions includes Card and Levine (2000), Hunt (1995), Katz and Meyer (1990), Lalive
and Zweimu¨ller (2004b), Moffitt (1985), Moffitt and Nicholson (1982), Winter-Ebmer (1998) and
Van Ours and Vodopivec (2006). These contributions to the literature are primarily based on
differences-in-differences approaches.3 The present paper goes beyond the existing literature in
proposing to use the regression discontinuity approach. This design is appealing. Berger et al.
(2005) find that the regression discontinuity design very robustly identifies the effect that would
be found in a randomized experiment. The smaller second strand of the literature discusses
interactions between unemployment insurance and early retirement. Heyma and Van Ours
(2006) study how the early retirement option affects job finding rates among older workers in
the Netherlands. Riphahn (1997) compares the determinants of transitions into unemployment
and disability among older workers in German data. She concludes that critical variables such
as individual health or aggregate unemployment have clearly different effects on the two forms
of exit from employment. Dahl et al. (1999) reach a similar conclusion using Norwegian data.
The main contributions of this paper are the following. First, the paper studies a dramatic
change in potential benefit duration. This is appealing from an economic viewpoint because
it provides evidence on the maximum extent to which changing the potential benefit duration
individuals who have just turned 50 years. See McCrary (2005) and Lee and McCrary (2005) for a discussion of
manipulation in the regression discontinuity design.
3In the static labor supply literature, Lemieux and Milligan (2005) study the incentive effects of social assistance
on the decision to work in a regression discontinuity design (RDD) and discuss the relationship between the RDD
and the differences-in-differences approach. Moreover, Card et al. (2006) discuss the likely reasons for the effects
of extended benefits on unemployment duration exploiting discontinuities in Austrian severance pay rules.
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contributes to unemployment. Moreover, because the treatment dose is so large, a graphical
analysis of the treatment effect is quite informative. Second, this paper identifies the effects
of the same change in potential benefit duration at two thresholds – the age threshold and the
border threshold. This is useful because the regression discontinuity assumption may be satisfied
for the geographic analysis but not necessarily for the age based strategy. Moreover, because the
effect of treatment may depend on the characteristics of individuals, this paper illustrates that
the average effects identified at two thresholds do not agree because the underlying threshold
populations differ. Third, the analysis uses rich, high quality, comprehensive data from two
administrative sources, the Austrian social security database, and the Austrian unemployment
insurance register. These data provide a comprehensive account of the entire work history of
individuals since the year 1972. Moreover, the data record very accurately both the age at entry
into unemployment and the place of residence of job seekers. These two pieces of information are
crucial in implementing a convincing regression discontinuity identification strategy. Fourth, the
data cover the universe of all unemployment spells. This allows concentrating on unemployment
spells that are fairly close to the age and border thresholds thus limiting the possible biases due
to mis-specification. Indeed, results indicate that the effects of both age and distance border on
average unemployment duration can be captured in a relatively simple manner – a model with a
linear trend on both sides of the threshold. This means that the empirical analysis convincingly
identifies the effect of extended benefits and early retirement rules on unemployment duration.
Fifth, many countries are developing strategies for their pension systems to be able to cope with
rapidly ageing populations. This paper argues that it may be important to focus on pathways
to retirement that are generated by social assistance programs outside the pension system.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides background on the unemployment
insurance system, on the regional extended benefit program, and on the early retirement rules
in Austria. Section 3 discusses the dataset and provides descriptive statistics on the sub-samples
of eligible and ineligible job seekers used in the main analysis. Section 4 provides descriptive
evidence on the effects of REBP on unemployment duration, on the composition of the unem-
ployment inflow, and on the size of the unemployment inflow. Section 5 discusses identification
and estimation of treatment effects in the regression discontinuity design. Section 6 provides the
regression analysis of the effects of REBP on unemployment duration, and section 7 concludes
this paper with a summary of our findings.
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2 Background
This section discusses the Austrian unemployment insurance and early retirement rules and it
provides background on the REBP. Moreover, the section discusses why the REBP may affect
women differently from men.
Unemployment insurance: The design of the Austrian unemployment insurance system
is encoded in a national unemployment insurance law (Arbeitslosenversicherungsgesetz ). Before
August 1989, an unemployed person could draw regular unemployment benefits (UB) for a maxi-
mum period of 30 weeks provided that he or she had paid unemployment insurance contributions
for at least 156 weeks within the last 5 years.4 In August 1989 the potential duration of UB
payments became dependent not only on previous experience but also on age at the beginning
of the unemployment spell. Benefit duration for the age group 40-49 was increased to 39 weeks
if the unemployed has been employed 312 weeks within the last 10 years prior to the current
spell. For the age group 50 and older, UB-duration was increased to 52 weeks if the unemployed
has been employed for at least 468 weeks within the last 15 years.
Voluntary quitters and workers discharged for misconduct can not claim benefits until a
waiting period of 4 weeks has passed. UB recipients are expected to search actively for a
new job that should be within the scope of the claimant’s qualifications, at least during the
first months of the unemployment spell. Non-compliance with the eligibility rules is subject to
benefit sanctions that can lead to the withdrawal of benefits for up to 4 weeks.
Compared to other European countries, the replacement ratio (UB relative to gross monthly
earnings) is rather low. The amount of UB payments depends on previous earnings and, in 1990,
the replacement ratio was 40.4 % for the median income earner; 48.2 % for a low-wage worker
who earned half the median; and 29.6 % for a high-wage worker earning twice the median. On
top, family allowances are paid. UB payments are not taxed implying that net-replacement
rates are substantially higher than 40 %, and there is no experience rating of firms.
After UB payments have been exhausted, job seekers can apply for ’transfer payments for
those in need’ (Notstandshilfe).5 As the name indicates, these social assistance transfers are
means-tested. Social assistance payments depend on the income and wealth situation of other
family members and close relatives and may, in principle, last for an indefinite time period. These
transfers are granted for successive periods of 39 weeks after which eligibility requirements are
recurrently checked. The social assistance transfers are lower than UB and can at most be 92
% of UB. In 1990, the median post-UB transfer payment was about 70 % of the median UB
4UB duration was 20 weeks for job-seekers who did not meet this requirement. This paper focuses on individuals
who were entitled to at least 30 weeks of benefits.
5This implies that job seekers who do not meet UB eligibility criteria can apply at the beginning of their spell
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among job seekers who were eligible for social assistance. Note however, that individuals who
are eligible for such transfers may not be comparable to individuals who collect UB because not
all individuals who exhaust UB pass the means test. The majority of the unemployed (59 %)
received UB whereas 26 % received social assistance transfers.
The Regional Extended Benefits Program: The background of the REBP is strongly
tied to the history of the Austrian steel sector. To protect its assets after World War II from
Soviet appropriation and to provide the capital needed for reconstruction, Austria nationalized
its iron, steel, and oil industries, large segments of the heavy engineering and electrical industries,
most of the coal mines, and the nonferrous metals industries. State owned firms in manufacturing
were part of a large holding company, the Oesterreichische Industrie AG, OeIAG. By the mid-
1970s this holding company was running into serious problems related to shrinking markets,
overstaffing, too heavy concentration on outmoded smokestack industries, insufficient research
and development, and low productivity. Initially, the Austrian government covered the losses
by subsidies. But in 1986, after the steel industry was hit by an oil speculation scandal and
failure of a U.S. steel plant project, this protectionist policy was abolished. A new management
was appointed and a strict restructuring plan was implemented. This plan aimed at focusing on
the holdings’ core competencies. The result were layoffs due to plant closures and downsizing,
particularly in the steel industry.
To mitigate the labor market problems in the concerned regions the Austrian government
enacted a law that extended UB-entitlement to 209 weeks for a specific subgroup. An unem-
ployed worker became eligible to 209 weeks of UB if he or she satisfied, at the beginning of his
or her unemployment spell, each of the following criteria: (i) age 50 or older; (ii) a continuous
work history (780 employment weeks during the last 25 years prior to the current unemploy-
ment spell); (iii) location of residence in one of 28 selected labor market districts since at least
6 months prior to the claim; and (iv) start of a new unemployment spell after June 1988 or
spell in progress in June 1988. The REBP was initially expected to be in effect until December
1991. However, the Austrian parliament decided at the end of 1991 to extend the program until
August 1993 when it was eventually abolished.
The minister for social affairs, a member of the ruling party SPO¨, was in charge of selecting
those regions that became eligible to the program. Records of the meetings in which the set of
regions eligible to the program was decided are not open to the public. However, Lalive and
Zweimu¨ller (2004a) show that eligible regions were characterized by a strong concentration of
employment in the steel sector and that there are no differences between regions in terms of
unemployment. These two facts support an explanation that the program was targeted towards
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regions with a relatively high share of employment in the steel sector rather than towards
regions with high structural unemployment. Note that except for the REBP, all other labor
market institutions do not differ across regions.
This discussion implies, first, that it might be difficult to draw reliable evidence on the
effect of REBP from a global comparison of treated and control regions because these regions
are characterized by a different industry structure. However, a local comparison at the border
between treated and control regions can be quite informative if communities located on both
sides of the border are similar in terms of industry and age structure. Second, it is clear that
individuals entering unemployment from a job in the steel industry were not only facing a
different unemployment insurance regime but were affected by the restructuring of the steel
sector. Thus it is very difficult to isolate the effects of extended benefits on unemployment
duration in the non-steel inflow. This paper therefore proposes to focus on the non-steel inflow.
Note that more than 80 % of all job seekers were not previously employed in the steel sector.
This means that concentrating on the non-steel inflow allows identifying the effects of extended
benefits on an important sub-sample of the entire unemployment inflow.
Early Retirement Rules: Austrian social security legislation provides for regular old age
pensions at age 65 for men and age 60 for women. Pension benefits depend on contributions
to the pension system in the 156 months (13 years) prior to leaving the labor force, and on the
total number of months contributed to the pension system.
There are two early retirement pathways available at age 60 for men and at age 55 for women.
The first is provided for individuals who have a long contribution history, that is, worked for at
least 420 months (35 years) prior to claiming early retirement. Also, individuals applying for
this early retirement option must have worked for at least 2 out of the previous 3 years before
entering early retirement. The second early retirement option is available to individuals who
have spent at least 12 out of the previous 15 months claiming unemployment benefits, post-UB
transfers, or special income support.
A third measure affecting older workers is Sonderunterstu¨tzung (special income support).
This measure was originally created in January 1974 to support individuals in the mining sector
who were permanently displaced just prior to becoming eligible for early retirement. The special
income support program provides benefits for at most one year; benefits are 25 % higher than
unemployment benefits capped from above by the pension benefit the individual is expected to
receive from the pension system. In 1979, the system was extended to cover all men aged 59 years
or older and women aged 54 years or older, provided they had contributed to the pension system
for at least 15 out of the previous 25 years. Note that the previous contribution requirement for
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the special income support is identical to the contribution requirement for REBP.
Hypotheses: The effects of the REBP for men can be analyzed in the standard job search
framework where job seekers receive unemployment benefits as long as they have not exhausted
the potential benefit duration. Thereafter job seekers are eligible for reduced social assistance
transfers. Mortensen (1977) argues that extending the potential benefit duration in such a
system tends to reduce the transition rate to regular jobs because it postpones the exhaustion
of regular unemployment benefits.6 This reduction in the unemployment exit rate leads to
prolonged unemployment duration.
In contrast to men, women have access to special income support once unemployment benefits
have been exhausted. This means that in contrast to the standard job search model, eligible
women are facing an upward sloping time path of benefits discouraging job search strongly.7
Thus, REBP is expected to prolong unemployment duration much more strongly for women
than for men.
Moreover, firms and workers may even use REBP to change their early retirement strategies.
Laying off an older worker who is unproductive but has been employed with the firm for a long
period damages the reputation of the firm. In contrast, offering this worker an early retirement
option is a way to end the employment relationship without damaging one’s reputation among
on-going jobs. Thus, providing early retirement is an attractive option for firms who want to
keep a reputation as a long-term employer but also desire to end employment relationships that
are marginally unproductive. In general, financing early retirement is costly. However, since
REBP replaces at least 40 % of previous income, this strategy becomes attractive for firms
who expect significant savings from ending an employment relationship but do not want to be
perceived as reneging on a promise of long-term employment. They merely need to provide
severance pay to top off unemployment benefits in order to reach the level of a regular old
age pension. Analyzing unemployment duration is informative on the extent to which such
agreements may have taken place. Women with access to an early retirement package are
certain not to leave unemployment until they reach age 54 (special income support program
starts; income while unemployed is lower than special income support) or age 55 (regular early
retirement program starts; income while unemployed is higher than special income support).
This means that the duration of unemployment among eligible women with an early retirement
option is a monotonically decreasing function of the time from age at entry into unemployment
to age 54/55 years.
6Lalive et al. (2006) find that this is indeed the case for small benefit extensions.
7These predictions have been recently developed in the standard job search model (Hairault et al., 2006).
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3 Data
To assess the impact of benefit duration and early retirement rules on the duration of unem-
ployment spells, I use longitudinal individual data from two different sources: (i) the Austrian
social security database (ASSD) which contains detailed information on the individuals’ age,
employment, unemployment and earnings history since the year 1972, and some information
on the employer like region and industry affiliation; and (ii) the Austrian unemployment reg-
ister (AUR) from which I get information on the place of residence (community) and relevant
socio-economic characteristics. The data cover the universe of the unemployment inflow over
the period 1986 to 1995. The corresponding spells are followed up until the end of 1998.
Unemployment duration is measured in weeks registered at the unemployment office. There
are two important issues with analyzing unemployment duration. First, changes in benefit du-
ration may affect weeks of registered unemployment in a purely mechanical way if all individuals
are deregistered once unemployment benefits have lapsed. We investigate the sensitivity of our
results to measuring time in the unemployment register by also analyzing the time from regis-
tering at the unemployment insurance office until the next job starts.8 Our main finding is that
the results are not affected by the type of duration measure used in a quantitatively important
manner. Second, note that average unemployment duration is not affected by right censoring
because spells are observed until the end of 1998. Thus, fewer than 1% of all unemployment
spells are right censored in the data.
The empirical analysis extracts information on individuals entering unemployment from a job
in the non-steel sector in the time period 1/1986 until 12/1987 (before REBP) and in the time
period 8/1989 until 7/1991 (during REBP). The first time period covers the situation before
REBP was introduced. We restrict attention to the period after January 1986 because the
Austrian unemployment register only started in 1986. Moreover, we do not include information
on the period 1/1988 until 5/1988 because spells starting in this time period may already be
affected by REBP.9 The ’during REBP’ time period covers the longest possible time period
where REBP is introduced but no other changes in benefit entitlement take place. (Recall
that the maximum unemployment duration was changed as of August 1989.) Furthermore, the
analysis disregards the fourth quarter inflow into unemployment in the year 1991 because Lalive
and Zweimu¨ller (2004a) show that the inflow into unemployment was very strongly affected just
8If time to job exceeds 209 weeks (because there is no information on the next job in the data) we censor time
to next job at 209 weeks.
9Note that ongoing spells are affected by REBP. However, once a job seeker has exhausted regular unemploy-
ment benefits he or she is no longer eligible for REBP. Since the potential benefit duration was at most 30 weeks
prior to REBP, this sample selection ensures that REBP does not affect the ’before REBP’ analysis strongly.
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prior to the end of 1991.10
The analysis furthermore focuses on individuals with a ’continuous’ work history. Eligibility
for REBP (and special income support) requires 780 employment weeks (15 years) within the
last 25 years – an actual-to-potential experience ratio of at least 0.6. Since the Austrian social
security database only contains information as of January 1, 1972, we can observe at most 19.5
years prior to entry into unemployment on average. In order to keep possible misclassification
low, a continuous work history is defined as a career with a ratio of actual to potential work
experience (henceforth previous experience) since the year 1972 of at least 0.7. This ensures
that only workers who satisfy the work experience requirement with a very high probability are
included in the sample.11
The data contain information on the month and year of birth, and month and year of entry
into unemployment. This allows calculating the age at entry into unemployment by counting
the number of years and months of a persons life completed before entering unemployment.
For instance, a job seeker born in June 1940 who is entering unemployment in May 1990 is
aged 49 years and 11 months. In contrast, a job seeker born in the same month but entering
unemployment in June 1990 is aged 50 years and 0 months.12 The empirical analysis restricts
attention to individuals aged 46 years to 53 years (and 11 months) at the beginning of the
unemployment spell. This is the only age bracket where both women and men do not have
access to early retirement on the first day of the unemployment spell. Second, because age is
only recorded up to a precision of one month, we allow for clustering of the regression errors at
the age cell level to account for possible specification error as suggested in Card and Lee (2006).
The second identification strategy identifies the effect of REBP at the border between treated
and control regions.13 Figure 1 shows the distribution of REBP across the 2361 communities
in Austria. Interestingly, the treated regions (communities with blue shading) were all located
10Arguably, this can be rationalized by the fact that it was not certain whether REBP would be extended.
Firms and workers therefore had a strong incentive to make use of the generous unemployment insurance rules
provided by REBP.
11The data contain information on employment dating back to the late 1940s for about 30 % of all individuals
(REV Daten). This information can be used to assess the quality of the threshold rule used in the empirical
analysis. Findings indicate that 61 % of all job seekers with an actual to potential experience ratio of .6 to .7
actually fulfill the 15 out of 25 years requirement. The corresponding figure is 81 % for job seekers with a ratio
of .7 to .8, it is 94 % for job seekers with a ratio of .8 to .9, and it is 99 % for job seekers with a ratio of .9 to
1. This suggests that the .7 threshold is successful in identifying eligible individuals (the average probability of
being eligible exceeds 94 %). Note, however, that we can not concentrate on the sub-sample of individuals with
REV information since this sub-sample is not a random draw from the unemployment inflow.
12Note that this job seeker may have been born on June 30, 1940 but entered unemployment on June 1, 1990
missing almost one month to her or his 50th birthday. Results strongly suggest that this person was nevertheless
eligible for REBP (see Figure 2). Arguably, this can be explained by the fact that the caseworkers in the
unemployment insurance office only consider month and year of birth and unemployment entry when assessing a
claimant’s eligibility status.
13See Holmes (2005) and Hoxby (2000) for important geography based analyses in urban economics and the
economics of education.
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on a contiguous area located in the Eastern part of Austria and stretching from the North-
ern border to the Southern border. The program covers parts of the provinces Burgenland,
Carinthia (Ka¨rnten), Lower Austria (Niedero¨sterreich), Upper Austria (Obero¨sterreich), and
Styria (Steiermark).
Figure 1 about here
It is crucial to measure the distance of each community to the border between treated and
control regions. Figure 1 shows that communities which appear to be located close to the border
on the map need not be close in economic terms because they are separated by mountainous
terrain (for instance in the Alpine center of Austria). We therefore use a measure that reflects
travel time – an economically more relevant measure of distance between locations than air
distance. Specifically, the distance to the border of community A is the number of minutes it
takes to drive a car from a community across the border, i.e. to the closest community that is
located on the other side of the border.14 This travel distance measure is superior to using air
distance between communities because it accounts for possible geographic barriers (mountains,
rivers) between communities that look adjacent on a map. The minimal distance from a commu-
nity in the treated region to the nearest control region community is 5 minutes. We normalize
travel distance from this treated community to the border to be zero because this community
is, effectively, located exactly on the border between treated and control communities.15
For control region communities we perform the same calculation with the only difference that
we record the negative of the travel distance by car. Thus non-negative values of the distance
to border variable refer to treated communities. Negative values of the distance to border refer
to control communities. The analysis identifies the effect of REBP on unemployment duration
at the border between treated and control communities, i.e. at zero minutes distance to border.
The empirical analysis restricts attention to individuals living no farther than a 70 minutes
car drive from the border because the density of the inflow into unemployment is very low
in communities located further than 70 minutes car distance from the border. Furthermore,
we also exclude unemployment spells that start in Vienna (a control region city located at 33
minutes from the border between treated and control regions) because Vienna is a very dominant
community characterized by long unemployment duration.
14The distance measure reflects the time required to drive from the center of community A to the center of
the community on the other side of the border using the fastest road connection between these two communities
under normal conditions. We obtained this information in 2000 from a commercial provider of rout planning
software in Austria (DDS Digital Services). Note that the travel distance by car measured in this paper may
not properly reflect the travel distance at the beginning of the 1990s. Nevertheless, we believe that this measure
of travel distance is likely to contain important information on the geographic distance between communities
because there were no major changes to road infrastructure.
15Specifically, we subtract 5 minutes travel distance from each treated region community’s distance to the
border between regions.
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The key issue in terms of identification is the location of steel plants in terms of distance to
the border between treated and control regions. Even though the analysis focuses on the non-
steel inflow, the steel restructuring operations may spill over to other industries. There are two
main channels for spillovers. First, industries that are supplying materials to the steel industry
can be affected. Second, the reduction in steel worker incomes may spill over to other industries
via reduced demand for goods. The national steel holding’s two largest plants are located in the
city of Linz (Upper Austria), and Donawitz, located near the city of Leoben (Styria). Our data
indicates that it takes 24 minutes to drive from the city of Linz to the border between treated
and control regions. The distance from Donawitz to the border is even longer – 34 minutes.
Arguably, this suggests that spillovers from steel do not affect estimates of the effect of REBP
at the border between treated and control regions.16
Table 1 reports key background statistics on the job seekers entering unemployment from a
job in the non-steel sector in the time during REBP (8/1989-7/1991), by gender, age and region
of residence.17
Table 1 about here
Table 1 indicates that there are 4759 treated male individuals, that is individuals aged 50-53
years, living in treated regions (Panel A, Column 1). Average age is slightly lower than 52 years
reflecting the fact that the inflow is concentrated somewhat among individuals closer to the
50 year threshold. On average, treated individuals live about a 28 minutes car drive from the
border between treated and control regions. About 83 % of all men who enter unemployment
are married, and about 48 % of the job seekers were previously employed in construction.18
Table 1 shows that there are 4975 men starting an unemployment spell also in treated
regions but aged 46-49 years (Panel A, Column 2). Clearly, average age (48 years) in this group
is lower than in the group of treated individuals. However, this first control group appears to
be living at roughly similar distance to the border between treated and control regions and
the younger group of job seekers living in treated regions is quite comparable to the eligible
older group of job seekers in terms of the family situation. In the control communities, there
are 8537 men entering unemployment in the age group 50-53 years (Table 1, Panel A, Column
3).19 Average age for control region job seekers is identical to treated individuals. However,
16Note that spillovers from steel are unlikely to bias the identification strategy at the age 50 years threshold
because these spillovers affect both job seekers similarly on both sides of the threshold.
17These control variables are used in the empirical analysis. In addition, the empirical analysis uses information
on family situation, education, nationality, wage in previous job, skill level (white collar vs. blue collar), and
previous industry to control for possible differences between treated and control spells.
18Note that the high share of construction workers in the unemployment inflow reflects strong seasonal unem-
ployment in the construction sector rather than the relative size of this sector compared to other sectors.
19The inflow into unemployment is larger in the control regions than in treated regions because more people
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these individuals are living on average 39 minutes from the border between treated and control
regions. This indicates that the average control individual is living in a community that could be
quite different due to geographic location from the community of the average treated individual.
Indeed, the construction sector inflow is much larger in control regions (60 %) than in treated
regions (48 %). This suggests paying particular attention to how the construction share changes
when approaching the border between treated and control regions. With respect to the family
situation job seekers in control regions (82 % are married) are similar to job seekers in treated
regions (83 % are married).
There are 3466 women entering unemployment who satisfy both the age and region of res-
idence requirement for REBP (Table 1 Panel B Column 1). The average age among women is
51.5 years; about .3 years lower than the average age among treated men. This could be due
to the fact that REBP might have been more relevant among women near the age 50 threshold
compared to men. Second, about 78 % of all eligible women are married and about 3 % of these
women were previously employed in the construction sector.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the two control groups for women (Panel B Columns
2 and 3). There are 2193 women entering unemployment in the age bracket 46-49 years in the
period with REBP in treated regions (Panel B Column 2). The family situation of the job
seekers who fail the age requirement is quite different from the eligible group of job seekers.
Whereas 78 % of the eligible women are married, only 70 % of the women below the age 50
threshold are married. In terms of identification, it is important to see whether this difference
occurs at the age threshold. The second control group comprises the 3625 women who do not
live in treated regions but satisfy the age requirement (Panel B Column 3). Note that average
age in this group is 51.9 which is slightly higher than the average age in the treated group is
51.5 years. Moreover, the fraction married in the control group is again somewhat lower (72 %)
than in the treated group (78 %).
4 Descriptive Evidence on the Effects of REBP
This section reports descriptive evidence on the effects of REBP on unemployment duration,
on the effects of age and distance to border before REBP was introduced, and on the effects of
REBP on inflow composition and on inflow size.
Results for Men: Figure 2 reports descriptive evidence on the effect of REBP on average
unemployment duration among men.
Figure 2 about here
live and work in control region communities than in treated regions.
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Figure 2 reports average unemployment duration by age at entry into unemployment for
each age quarter from 46 years and 1 quarter to 53 years and 4 quarters. The evidence is based
on 9734 individuals living in treated regions, i.e. 4759 treated individuals aged 50 years and
older and 4975 control individuals aged 46 to 49 years. All figures superimpose the fit of a linear
regression allowing for a discontinuity at the threshold and linear trends in the assignment
variable (age or distance to border) on both sides of the threshold (see section 5 for further
discussion on estimation).
Control individuals remain unemployed for 13 weeks on average. In contrast, average unem-
ployment duration exceeds 26 weeks in almost all age cells for individuals aged 50 years or older.
There is a significant discontinuity in average unemployment duration that occurs between indi-
viduals aged 49 years and 4 quarters and individuals aged 50 years and 1 quarter. This suggests
that there is a strong effect of REBP on the average duration of unemployment spells.
Figure 3 about here
Figure 3 identifies the effect of REBP by comparing individuals living on both sides of the
border between treated and control regions. This figure is based on 13296 individuals who are
50 years or older at the beginning of their unemployment spell, i.e. the 4759 treated individuals
(who live in treated regions) and the 8537 control individuals (who live in control regions).20
Average unemployment duration is roughly 13 weeks in the control regions (negative values of
distance to border). Furthermore, unemployment duration appears to decrease slightly when
approaching the border between treated and control regions. In contrast, as soon as we enter
the the treated region, average unemployment duration increases significantly to more than 26
weeks. This suggests, again, that REBP strongly increases average unemployment duration
among men living close to the border between treated and control regions. In line with control
regions, there is a negative relationship between average unemployment duration and distance
to border in treated regions.
The evidence in Figures 2 and 3 suggest that there are important discontinuities in the
duration of unemployment at age 50 and at the border between treated and control regions.
Have these discontinuities been caused by REBP? This is true only if the counterfactual average
20The figure reports average unemployment duration for each distance to border cell of width 5 minutes, i.e.
the first cell reporting average unemployment duration in communities located 65-69 minutes from the border
between treated and control regions (-67.6 minutes), the second cell reporting evidence for communities at 60-64
minutes distance (-62.5 minutes), ..., and the last cell reporting evidence for the community located 55 to 69
minutes from the border (62.5 minutes). Note that the cells at distance 10 to 14 minutes, 5 to 9 minutes to the
border from the control region side, and the cells 0 to 4 minutes, and 5 to 9 minutes distance to the border on the
treated region side are aggregated because the cells close to the border are based on fewer than 150 spells. For
the same reason, the descriptive analysis aggregates the cells 55-59 minutes, 60-64 minutes, and 65-69 minutes
distance to border into one cell. Note, however, that the econometric analysis is based on the continuous distance
to border measure.
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duration without REBP varies smoothly with age and distance to border. In particular, jumps
in unemployment duration at age 50 and at the border that occur for reasons other than benefit
eligibility have to be ruled out. I therefore investigate whether average duration of unemployment
varies smoothly before REBP was introduced. Figure 4 reports average unemployment duration
as a function of age and distance to border in the period from 1/1986 until 12/1987, i.e. 2.5
years to .5 years before REBP was introduced.
Figure 4 about here
Figure 4A reports the effects of age on unemployment duration. Men who are 46 years old
remain unemployed for about 13 weeks on average. As age increases, so does average unem-
ployment duration. Men who are 53 years old when registering at the unemployment office are
expected to be unemployed for about 16 weeks. Importantly, there are some differences in terms
of average unemployment duration at the age 50 threshold. Men who are in the age bracket 49
years and 4 quarters are unemployed for roughly 14 weeks. In contrast, men who have just cele-
brated their 50th birthday remain unemployed for 17 weeks on average, and the linear regression
suggests that this difference is statistically significant. This evidence thus suggests that it may
be important to account for pre-existing differences in average unemployment duration at the
age 50 years threshold.
Figure 4B assesses how average unemployment duration varies with distance to border.
Before REBP, average unemployment duration is about 13 weeks in control region communities
at 70 minutes distance to the border. Duration of job search increases monotonically from less
than 13 weeks to about 20 weeks when approaching the border between treated and control
regions. Importantly, there is no significant difference in average unemployment duration on
both sides of the border. The evidence in Figure 4B thus suggests that identifying the effect of
REBP by contrasting average unemployment duration in communities located at both sides of
the border is a meaningful identification strategy.
For this identification strategy to be valid, however, the composition of the inflow pool
needs to be balanced at the age and border threshold in the period with REBP. Two important
characteristics are marital status and previous employment in construction. Marital status is
important primarily because it is related to the potential level of the social assistance transfers.
The idea is that married individuals are more likely to live with a working spouse. Since
means testing focuses on household rather than individual income, the likelihood that married
individuals will receive social assistance is lower. This suggests that married individuals remain
unemployed shorter than non-married individuals all else equal. Construction employment is
important because it proxies for seasonal unemployment which reflects unemployment due to
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a temporary rather than a permanent layoff. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on these
important background characteristics and shows that the share married is not balanced with
respect to age and the construction share is not balanced between treated and control regions.
Figure 5 therefore assesses how the composition of the inflow into unemployment varies with
age and distance to border.
Figure 5 about here
Focusing on men entering unemployment in treated regions in the age bracket 45-53 years,
Figure 5A reveals that marital status indeed appears to be correlated with age. In the age
bracket 46-48 years, the share married increases from about 75 % to about 80 %. Importantly,
there is no discontinuity at the age 50 threshold. Roughly 80 % of all job seekers who are aged
50 years and 1 quarter are married. The share married increases from 80 % to about 86 % in
the age bracket 50 to 53.
Figure 5B discusses inflow composition with respect to previous employment in construc-
tion as a function of distance to border. In control regions, the share previously employed in
construction is about 60 % irrespective of distance to the border between treated and control
regions. Just on the other side of the border, the share previously employed in construction
decreases quite strongly but insignificantly to 53 %. The share previously employed in con-
struction decreases further as distance to border increases and reaches a level of less than 40
% in communities located at distance 40 minutes to the border. Moving further away from the
border, we find that the construction share increases again to about 50 %.
A final concern with the identification strategy refers to how likely it is that firms and
individuals manipulate their location on either side of the threshold. While it is clearly difficult
to manipulate one’s age, it is very well possible that firms and individuals can manipulate the
age at entry into unemployment. Figure 6 therefore assesses whether the relative size of the
inflow into unemployment is affected by the REBP.21
Figure 6 about here
Figure 6A reports relative inflow for the age based identification strategy among men. Rel-
ative inflow is the likelihood ratio of age, i.e. the ratio of the density of age in treated regions
21It would be desirable to report the unemployment inflow rate, that is, the number of spells entering unem-
ployment relative to employment. Our employment data, however, are based on the location of the previous
employer rather than of the location of the individual’s residence. This means that it is not possible to calculate
unemployment risk appropriately. Note that relative inflow is, however, informative on inflow risk (unemployment
inflow divided by employment) if the age structure of employment is identical in treated and control regions up
to a constant.
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to the density of age in control regions.22 Figure 6A indicates that the likelihood ratio is close
to 1 throughout the entire support suggesting that there is no concentration of the inflow at a
particular age bracket. This suggests that manipulation of the age at entry into unemployment
does not occur among men.
Figure 6B reports relative inflow for the border based identification strategy. Relative inflow
is the likelihood ratio of distance to border, i.e. the ratio between the density of distance to
border in the age bracket 50-53 years to the density of distance to border in the age bracket
46-49 years. In control communities, relative inflow is 1 indicating that the number of older
workers entering unemployment is almost identical to the number of younger workers. Relative
inflow is also close to 1 in treated communities located no farther than 30 minutes from the
border. Relative inflow becomes more noisy in communities located 35 minutes and more from
the border reflecting the fact that these distance to border cells are relatively small. Again,
there appears to be no manipulation of location of residence.
Results for Women: Figure 7 concentrates on women entering unemployment in treated
regions in the age bracket 46 to 53 years and it displays three striking facts.23 First, there is a
very salient increase in unemployment duration at the age 50 threshold. Whereas the women who
are slightly younger than the threshold leave unemployment on average after about 16 weeks,
women who are slightly older than the threshold do not exit unemployment for more than 130
weeks on average. Thus, there appears to be a strongly significant increase in unemployment
duration by at least 110 weeks. Second, in the age bracket 50 to 53 years, there is a very strong
decrease in average unemployment duration from more than 130 weeks (age 50 years and 1
quarter) to less than 52 weeks (age 53 years and 4 quarters). This evidence is consistent with an
interpretation that a substantial fraction of eligible women remain unemployed until they turn
54, the minimum age required in the special income support program.24 Third, in contrast to
men, there appears to be a decline in average unemployment duration from about 26 weeks at
age 48 to about 16 weeks at age 49.
Figure 7 about here
22Specifically, the density in treated (control) regions is the ratio of the number of spells observed in each age
bracket relative to the total number of spells in treated (control) regions. Each point in Figure 6A is the ratio
between these two densities.
23Note that the y-axis for women covers the first three years in an unemployment spell rather than merely the
first year as for men. Women who are 46 years old remain unemployed for about 20 weeks on average; this is
somewhat longer than average unemployment duration among men in the same age bracket (see Figure 2). This
can be explained by seasonal (construction sector) unemployment being much more relevant for men than for
women.
24Note, however, that it it is not true that all women at the age 50 threshold are using REBP as an early
retirement pathway. If this were the case the average duration of unemployment would have to exceed 200 weeks
for women entering unemployment at age 50 instead of reaching a level of 141 weeks.
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Figure 8 uses variation in distance to border among women aged 50 years or older to identify
the effect of REBP. There is hardly any variation in the duration of job search as one approaches
the border between treated and control regions from the control region side. Average unemploy-
ment duration oscillates around 26 weeks, i.e. almost twice the average for men (see Figure 3).
However, as one crosses the border between treated communities and control communities, un-
employment duration increases significantly from 26 weeks to a level of 78 weeks, i.e. an increase
by exactly one year. Thus, there appears to be a tremendous increase in average unemployment
duration associated with REBP. Note that the effect of REBP at the border is much weaker
than the effect of REBP at age 50 years.
Figure 8 about here
Using pre-program data for women, we find that there is neither a significant discontinuity
in expected unemployment duration at the age 50 threshold nor at the border between treated
and control regions. Moreover, inflow composition does not appear differ at the border between
treated and control regions; the share married does not significantly differ on both sides of the
border. In contrast, inflow composition appears to be significantly affected at the age threshold.
Women aged 50 years are significantly and quantitatively importantly (6.5 percentage points)
more likely to be married than women who just fail the age threshold.
Figure 9 discusses the effects of REBP on the relative size of the inflow among women. There
is a striking spike in the number of women entering unemployment exactly at age 50 years and
1 quarter in treated regions relative to control regions (Figure 9A). Whereas relative inflow is
around 1 in the age group 45-49 years, relative inflow peaks at almost 3 in the age cell 50 years
and 1 quarter.25 With increasing age, however, relative inflow drops strongly and reaches a level
of about 1 in the age bracket 51 to 52 years. Relative inflow is below 1 in the age group 53
years.26 The fact that the inflow size is affected strongly by REBP suggests that the age based
identification strategy could be affected by inflow effects.
Figure 9 about here
Interestingly, in contrast to the age based identification strategy, the border based identi-
fication strategy appears to be much less strongly affected by inflow size effects (Figure 9B).
25Specifically, in control regions there 256 spells in the age bracket 50 years and 1 quarter. In treated regions,
there are 596 (!) spells in the age bracket 50 years and 1 quarter. Relative inflow is .105=596/5659 (total age
46-49 inflow in treated regions) divided by .036=256/7063 (total age 46-49 inflow in control regions). There is no
evidence that these spells are due to the closing of one large plant.
26This is due to the fact that the size of the inflow increases quite strongly at age 53 years in control regions,
i.e. the age when women in control regions can also use the unemployment benefit system as a pathway to early
retirement because potential benefit duration is one year.
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Relative inflow increases monotonically and quite smoothly from control communities at distance
70 minutes from the border to treated communities at distance 20 minutes from the border from
a likelihood ratio of about .6 to a likelihood ratio of 1. On the other side of the border, relative
inflow is about 1.2 which is only slightly and insignificantly higher than relative inflow in con-
trol communities providing information on the counterfactual unemployment duration without
REBP. This suggests that the border based identification strategy is less affected by the effects
of REBP on the size of the unemployment inflow.
Taken together, these descriptive analyzes suggest that an estimation strategy that measures
the discontinuity at the threshold identifies the causal effect of extended benefits on unemploy-
ment duration at both thresholds for men and at the border threshold for women.27
5 Identification and Estimation
The goal of the regression discontinuity approach is to measure the discontinuity in expected
unemployment duration at the assignment threshold S0 (age 50 years or distance to border 0
minutes). Because the design in the REBP context is sharp, this discontinuity identifies the
average causal effect for the threshold population of job seekers if the expected non-treatment
unemployment duration is continuous at the threshold (Hahn et al., 2001).
I have provided three pieces of evidence that allow discussing the validity of this identifying
assumption in the previous section. First, I have provided evidence on how expected unem-
ployment duration varies with S in the time period before REBP was introduced. This allows
assessing whether continuity of the non-treatment outcome is fulfilled without the program.
However, introducing the program may invalidate evidence before the program was introduced.
In particular, firms and workers may agree to postpone entry into unemployment until the el-
igibility criteria have been satisfied. I therefore provide, second, evidence that allows assessing
whether important background characteristics such as marital status or previous employment
27Firms can not respond at the border threshold because workers have to be living for at least 6 months in
treated regions. Yet, firms also do not appear to delay laying off a 49 year old until she or he is 50 years old. This
can be understood by considering the theory behind a layoff. A firm induces a layoff if the expected contribution
(i.e. productivity minus total costs) of a particular worker to firm profit is negative. Suppose the firm realizes at
date t that worker i – aged 49 years and 11 months – contribution to firm profit is negative. The firm thus has a
strong incentive to fire the worker at date t. In contrast, the worker’s expected utility would be improved if the
firm delayed the layoff from date t to date t + 1 because the worker would be eligible for 209 weeks of extended
benefits instead of 39 weeks. This means that there are gains from trade. These gains can be realized if the
worker could propose to the firm that he or she will take a wage cut that is sufficient for expected contribution to
the firm’s profit to be non-negative. In the present context, however, such a trade is highly unlikely to take place
for at least two reasons. First, the worker is only slightly better off in the system with extended benefits because
extended benefits are valuable for workers who exhaust unemployment benefits. In the Austrian context, only 1
out of 14 workers in treated regions exhaust 39 weeks of benefits. Second, even if the gains from trade were large,
it is not possible for workers and firms to implement a temporary wage cut because unions would not agree with
such a deal. This means that it is not possible for workers and firms to delay entry into unemployment.
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in construction are balanced at the assignment threshold. Third, I also provide evidence on the
effects of REBP on the relative density of the assignment variable S in the inflow into unem-
ployment in Figures 6 and 9. The idea is straightforward. Non-continuity of the density of S
indicates that firms and workers react to REBP. This reaction can induce a bias in the regression
discontinuity estimates if additional layoffs are selective, i.e. have different counterfactual unem-
ployment duration. Figure 9A suggests that there is an abnormal reaction at the age threshold
for women. The absence of a dip just before age 50 suggests, however, that this reaction has not
been caused by firms wanting to provide an early retirement option to women whom they expect
to remain long-term unemployed. Section 6 addresses the age threshold reaction by providing
results for a sub-group of women with information on previous unemployment duration. This
allows assessing whether there is selection bias within this sub-group.
The focus of RDD estimation is on identifying the discontinuity in average unemployment
duration Y at the assignment threshold S0. Specifically, I use the following linear regression
Yi = α0 + α1Di + β0(Si − S0) + β1Di(Si − S0) + ²i (1)
The parameter α1 measures the average causal effect of REBP on unemployment duration at the
assignment threshold S0. The parameters β0 and β1 capture the direct effects of the assignment
variable S on average unemployment duration.28
The crucial issue in RDD estimation is the specification of the correlation between the
outcome Y and the assignment variable S. This paper proposes two ways of assessing whether
the two-sided linear model specification (1) is appropriate. The first sensitivity analysis augments
the regression with quadratic and cubic terms in (S − S0). This is a parametric method of
assessing the sensitivity of our results. Second, I discuss sensitivity to functional form applying
a semiparametric version of model (1) to the data (Porter, 2003). Intuitively, the local linear
regression weighs data points such that information close to the threshold gets more weight than
information further away from the threshold.29
28Note that the data on S – age at entry into unemployment and distance to border between treated and control
regions – is not measured on a continuous scale. This introduces a specification error into model (1). Random
specification error introduces heteroscedasticity in the variance-covariance matrix of the error term and can be
addressed by clustering on the cells of S that are observed in the data (Card and Lee, 2006).
29Specifically, the local linear estimates are obtained by
argminα0,α1,β0,β1
N∑
i=1
[Yi − α0 − α1Di − β0(Si − S0)− β1Di(Si − S0)]2Kh(Si − S0) (2)
where Kh(u) = 3/4(1 − (u/h)2)I(|u| < h) is the Epanechnikov kernel, and h is the bandwidth. Note the basic
model (1) is a special case of the model (2) obtained by setting the bandwidth to∞, i.e. weighting all observations
equally. In the empirical analysis, I set the bandwidth to 2 years at the age threshold and to 30 minutes at the
border threshold. This ensures that about one half of all the observations from model (1) are used in model (2). I
also investigate sensitivity of estimates to bandwidth choice. Specifically, I also use bandwidths 1 year or 3 years
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The empirical analysis also addresses two additional concerns. First, the assumption of
continuity may not hold even before REBP was introduced. The sensitivity of the results based
on model (1) can be assessed by using information before REBP was introduced.30 Second, the
it is possible to improve the efficiency of the estimates by including observed characteristics into
the regression. The sensitivity analysis therefore adds all observed characteristics to the basic
model (1).
6 Econometric Results
This section presents the econometric estimates of the effects of REBP on unemployment du-
ration. Table 2 presents results for men, based on the age threshold in Panel A, and based
on the border threshold in Panel B. The first Column reports estimates that contrast average
unemployment duration on both sides of the age threshold. Results indicate that unemployment
duration is 14.6 weeks longer among men in the age bracket 50-53 years compared to men aged
46-49 years. The second Column reports the results from the basic model (1). Results indicate
that REBP prolongs unemployment duration by 14.8 weeks rather than 14.6 weeks.31 Moreover,
Figure 2 shows that the basic model fits the threshold data points well.
Table 2 about here
Because there is not necessarily a linear trend in the outcome, column 3 in Table 2 reports
results based on a cubic specification (again on both sides of the threshold). Results indicate
that the effect of REBP is weaker than in the basic model (11.2 weeks as opposed to 14.8 weeks).
Column 4 in Table 2 reports results that use Epanechnikov kernel weights to give more weight
to observations that are close to the age 50 threshold. The local linear estimate of the effect of
REBP on unemployment duration is 12.7 weeks, again lower than the basic model estimate of
14.8 weeks.32 Column 5 accounts for possible pre-existing differences in unemployment duration
at the age 50 threshold by using information before REBP was introduced. Results suggest that
REBP prolongs unemployment by about 11.3 weeks – a weaker effect than in the basic model.
for the age strategy and bandwidths 20 minutes or 40 minutes for the border strategy.
30Specifically, the model
Yi = α0Ti + α1TiDi + β0Ti(Si − S0) + β1TiDi(Si − S0) +
+ γ0 + γ1Di + γ2(Si − S0) + γ3Di(Si − S0) + ²i (3)
is estimated where Ti = 1 if the unemployment spell starts in the ”during REBP” period, and Ti = 0 other-
wise. Again, the parameter α1 provides the before-during-RDD (BD-RDD) estimate of the effect of REBP on
unemployment duration.
31The corresponding estimate using time to next job is 11.1 weeks.
32The local linear regression reported in Table 2 uses a bandwidth of 2 years. Estimates are not sensitive to
changes in the bandwidth (effect is 12.594 with a 1 year bandwidth, and 13.467 with a 3 years bandwidth).
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Column 6 absorbs random variation by adding observed characteristics. Results suggest that
REBP prolongs unemployment duration by 13.8 weeks.
The second identification strategy compares men entering unemployment living on both
sides of the border between treated and control regions (Table 2, Panel B). Contrasting treated
and control regions produces a prima facie treatment effect of about 13.9 weeks of REBP on
average unemployment duration (column 1). Adding a linear trend in distance to region – as in
the basic model (1) – indicates that REBP leads to an increase in unemployment duration by
13.6 weeks rather than 13.9 weeks.33 Again, fitting the quite non-linear trend observed in the
raw data with a linear trend captures the situation at the threshold quite well (see Figure 3.
Adding a quadratic and cubic term in distance to border leads to a stronger, albeit insignificant,
estimate of the effect of REBP on unemployment duration (column 3). The local linear estimate
of the corresponding effect is 12.6 weeks (column 4)– weaker than the basic model estimate of
13.6 weeks.34 Accounting for pre-existing differences in unemployment duration at the border
suggests that REBP prolongs unemployment duration by 11.8 weeks (column 5), and adding
observed characteristics suggests that REBP prolongs unemployment duration by about 12.0
weeks.
Turning to results for women (Table 3), I now discuss results based on the age strategy
(panel A) and the border strategy (panel B). Table 3 shows that contrasting women aged 50-53
years with women aged 46-49 years produces a prima facie effect of REBP on unemployment
duration of 68.2 weeks (column 1). This effect is, however, downward biased since unemployment
duration decreases strongly with age among women aged 50 or older. Adding a two-sided linear
trend produces an estimate of about 109.6 weeks in the basic model specification (column 2).35
The simple identification strategy is in line with the raw data below the threshold but it is below
average unemployment duration at age 50 and 1 quarters (see Figure 7). A model that adds
quadratic and cubic terms in age to the basic model (1) produces a much stronger effect of REBP
of 125.7 weeks (column 3). The local linear estimate of the effect of REBP on unemployment
duration is 121.8 weeks – almost in line with the cubic model estimate of 125.7 weeks but again
larger than the basic model estimate.36 The BD-RDD analysis produces an estimate of the
effect of REBP on unemployment duration of 109.4 weeks which is exactly in line with the basic
model estimate (column 5). Moreover, adding control variables to this specification tends to
33The corresponding estimate using time to next job is 20.1 weeks.
34The local linear regression reported in Table 2 uses a bandwidth of 30 minutes. Estimates are somewhat
sensitive to changes in the bandwidth (effect is 16.328 with a 20 minutes bandwidth, and 11.785 with a 40
minutes bandwidth).
35The corresponding estimate using time to next job is 110.2 weeks.
36The local linear regression reported in Table 3 uses a bandwidth of 2 years. Estimates are not sensitive to
changes in the bandwidth (effect is 123.503 with a 1 year bandwidth, and 119.981 with a 3 years bandwidth).
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reduce the treatment effect by about 7 weeks, from 109.6 weeks to 102.6 weeks (column 6).
Note that the particular feature of the age identification strategy is that the unemployment
inflow near the age 50 years threshold is strongly affected by REBP (Figure 9). This means
that average unemployment duration below the age 50 threshold is not informative on the
counterfactual situation for the age 50 unemployment inflow. One way of addressing this concern
is to find pre-program information on the average unemployment duration for women who are
aged 50-53 years during REBP. This is possible for women who have been repeatedly unemployed
women. Figure 10A reports the average first unemployment spell duration in the pre-program
period conditional on age attained at the start of the during-program spell.37 There is no
quantitatively important discontinuity in unemployment duration at the threshold for repeatedly
unemployed women. The linear regression indicates that unemployment duration is 2.8 weeks
longer (with std.err. 1.5 weeks) for women aged 50 years compared to women aged 49 years and
11 months.
Figure 10 about here
Figure 10B plots average during-program duration for the sample of women with information
on pre-program duration. There is a strong and significant increase in unemployment duration
at the threshold. While repeatedly unemployed women age 50 years are expected to remain
unemployed for about 85 weeks, the counterfactual unemployment duration without extended
benefits is only 11 weeks. Thus, extended benefits appear to increase average unemployment
duration by 74.8 weeks (std. err. 6.5 weeks). This estimate of the causal effect is weaker than
all of the estimates reported in Table 3 Panel A. There are at least two explanations for this
weaker effect. On one hand, effects reported previously could be biased. On the other hand, the
repeatedly unemployed subgroup could be less responsive to extended benefits in general. It is
possible to assess the second explanation by studying repeatedly unemployed men. The average
causal effect of extended benefits for repeatedly unemployed men is 8.6 weeks (std. err. 3.2
weeks). This effect is smaller than the average causal effect for all men; repeatedly unemployed
men are less responsive to extended benefits than the average job seeker. This implies that
identification strategy using information on repeatedly unemployed women identifies a lower
bound of 74.8 weeks for the average causal effect of extended benefits for all women.
Table 3 about here
37Clearly, for individuals aged 46-47 the chances are very small that such information is available because the
data set is limited to the age group 46-53 years. There are 1,279 out of 5,6459 spells present in this analysis; 978
out of 3,466 spells for women age 50 years or older; 279 out of 2,193 spells for women age 49 or younger.
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Turning to the results obtained when contrasting unemployment duration for women living
on both sides of the border between treated and control regions (Table 3, Panel B), we find that
unemployment lasts 62.6 weeks longer in treated regions compared to control regions (column 1).
Adding a two sided linear trend reduces the estimated treatment effect to 50.6 weeks (column
2).38 Fitting a cubic polynomial on both sides of the border reduces the estimate of the treatment
effect somewhat (estimate is 46.4 weeks) but doing so reduces the precision of the estimate
considerably (standard error increases from 6.0 weeks to 15.8 weeks; Column 3). The local linear
estimate of the effect of REBP on unemployment duration is 43.3 weeks (column 4), again slightly
weaker than the basic model estimate of 50.6 weeks.39 Accounting for pre-existing differences in
unemployment duration at the border between treated and control regions produces a slightly
larger treatment effect of 54.0 weeks.40 Adding control variables to the linear specification
suggests that REBP tends to increase unemployment duration by about 44.9 weeks (column 6).
Interestingly, we again find that the relatively simple specification with a two sided linear trend
appears to capture the discontinuity in the raw data rather well (see Figure 8).
7 Conclusions
Austria implemented in the late 1980s and early 1990s a unique program that provides 209 weeks
of unemployment benefit duration but only to individuals aged 50 years or older who have been
living in certain parts of Austria and satisfy a work requirement. Because the program was
strictly targeted with respect to age and region, this paper proposes to evaluate the effects of
this program using a regression discontinuity design. The basic idea is that job seekers who
just fail the age or residence requirement may provide useful information on the counterfactual
situation for eligible workers who just satisfy the requirement. Moreover, because women have
access to early retirement at age 54 years but men have access to early retirement only at age
59 years, this program also offers a unique opportunity to learn about the interactions between
the pension system and unemployment insurance.
Results for men indicate that extended benefit duration increases unemployment duration.
The identification strategy at the age threshold measures the effects of an increase from 39 weeks
to 209 weeks – by 170 weeks. The duration of job search is prolonged by about 14.8 weeks by
38The corresponding estimate using time to next job is 47.5 weeks.
39The local linear regression reported in Table 3 uses a bandwidth of 30 minutes. Estimates are not at all
sensitive to changes in the bandwidth (effect is 44.576 with a 20 minutes bandwidth, and 43.534 with a 40
minutes bandwidth).
40Note that there is a positive difference in unemployment duration between the treated and control communities
at the border. Thus, one would expect the BD-RDD estimate in column 5 to be weaker than the levels estimate in
Column 2. However, note that the BD-RDD estimate uses information from all communities to calculate the pre-
existing differences. Applying the basic model to data before REBP suggests that the difference in unemployment
duration before REBP was introduced is negative (-3.5 weeks).
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this treatment. The identification strategy that compares job seekers living on both sides of
the border between treated and control regions identifies the effect of a treatment with slightly
smaller dose, an increase by 3 years, from 52 weeks to 209 weeks. The estimated effect on
unemployment is slightly smaller, 13.6 weeks rather than 14.8 weeks. Taking the ratio of effect
and treatment dose, we find that each week of extended benefits produces about .09 additional
weeks of unemployment duration or equivalently that it takes about 11 weeks of benefit duration
to add one week of unemployment duration.41
Comparing our findings for women and men, the following patterns emerge. First, we find
that the effects of REBP for women are much larger than the effects of REBP for men. The
lower bound on the effect of REBP on unemployment duration at the age threshold is 74.8 weeks
for women – about 5 times the effect for men. The effect of REBP for women on living on the
border between treated and control regions is 50.6 weeks – almost 4 times the effect for men.
Second, the effect of REBP at the age threshold is much larger than the effect at the border
threshold. Arguably, this is because the population treated at the age threshold has to wait
much longer to reach the early retirement age of 54 years than the population treated at the
border threshold. Because treated women at the border are 51.5 years old, the average distance
to early retirement is shorter (2.5 years) for the border strategy than for the age strategy (4.0
years). Taking the ratio of the causal effect to distance to early retirement (in weeks), indicates
that women tend to remain unemployed about 20 weeks longer for every year of benefit duration
that provides a direct pathway into early retirement.42 Thus Austrian unemployment insurance
provided a quantitatively important pathway into early retirement.
41Note that our results agree with the findings in Card and Levine (2000) and are somewhat larger than
the result in Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2004b). The findings reported in this paper may differ from Lalive and
Zweimu¨ller (2004b) for at least two reasons. First, Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2004b) apply a differences-in-differences
identification strategy that measures the overall effect of treatment on the treated rather than the effect of
treatment at the threshold. Second, simulations in Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2004b) apply to a reference individual
rather than the average unemployment duration of eligible individuals.
42Interestingly, the standardized affects agree very much at the age threshold (74.8 weeks / (4 years * 52 weeks
/ year) = .360) and at the border threshold (50.6 weeks / (2.5 years * 52 weeks / year) = .391). This suggests
that the lower bound of 74.8 weeks at the age threshold is close to the actual causal effect for all women.
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Figure 1: Regional distribution of REBP
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Figure 2: The effect of REBP on unemployment duration for men: age threshold
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Discontinuity at threshold = 14.798; with std. err. = 1.928.
Notes: Sample restricted to inflow into unemployment the period 8/1989 until 7/1991 (during REBP). Sample restricted to individuals living
in treated region.
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Database.
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Figure 3: The effect of REBP on unemployment duration for men: border threshold
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Notes: Sample restricted to inflow into unemployment the period 8/1989 until 7/1991 (during REBP). Sample is restricted to individuals aged
50 years or older.
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Database.
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Figure 4: The effects of age and distance before REBP: men
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Notes: Sample restricted to inflow into unemployment in the period 1/1986 until 12/1987 (before REBP). Sample for age identification is
restricted to treated region. Sample for border identification is restricted to individuals aged 50 years or older.
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Database.
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Figure 5: The Composition of the Unemployment Inflow: men
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Notes: Sample restricted to inflow into unemployment in the period 8/1989 until 7/1991 (during REBP). Sample for age identification is
restricted to treated region. Sample for border identification is restricted to individuals aged 50 years or older.
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Database.
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Figure 6: Inflow effects due to REBP: men
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Notes: Age: relative inflow is the ratio of the density of age in the treated region to the density of age in the control region. Border: relative
inflow is the ratio of the density of distance to border in the age bracket 50-53 years to the corresponding density in the age bracket 46-49
years. Sample restricted to inflow into unemployment in the period 8/1989 until 7/1991 (during REBP).
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Database.
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Figure 7: The effect of REBP on unemployment duration for women: age threshold
0
2
6
5
2
7
8
1
0
4
1
3
0
1
5
6
u
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t 
d
u
ra
ti
o
n
 (
w
ee
k
s)
46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54
age (years)
Discontinuity at threshold = 109.645; with std. err. = 4.927.
Notes: Sample restricted to inflow into unemployment the period 8/1989 until 7/1991 (during REBP). Sample is restricted to individuals
living in treated region.
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Database.
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Figure 8: The effect of REBP on unemployment duration for women: border threshold
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Notes: Sample restricted to inflow into unemployment the period 8/1989 until 7/1991 (during REBP). Sample is restricted to individuals aged
50 years or older.
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Database.
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Figure 9: Inflow effects due to REBP: women
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Notes: Age: relative inflow is the ratio of the density of age in the treated region to the density of age in the control region. Border: relative
inflow is the ratio of the density of distance to border in the age bracket 50-53 years to the corresponding density in the age bracket 46-49
years. Sample restricted to inflow into unemployment in the period 8/1989 until 7/1991 (during REBP).
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Database.
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Figure 10: Results for repeatedly unemployed women
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REBP in force.
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Database.
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TABLES
Table 1: Selected Descriptive Statistics (means)
Column (1) (2) (3)
Living in Treated region Treated region Control region
Age bracket 50-53 years 46-49 years 50-53 years
A. Men
Age (years) 51.7 48.0 51.7
Distance to border (minutes) 28.2 27.2 -39.2
Married (share) .828 .785 .821
Construction (share) .481 .492 .600
Number of spells 4759 4975 8537
B. Women
Age (years) 51.5 48.1 51.9
Distance to border (minutes) 27.1 26.6 -37.1
Married (share) .780 .696 .721
Construction (share) .030 .027 .034
Number of spells 3466 2193 3625
Source: Own calculations, based on ASSD.
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Table 2: Men: The effect of extended benefit duration on unemployment duration
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Age threshold
Treatment effect 14.605 14.798 11.153 12.715 11.356 13.831
(1.070)*** (1.928)*** (3.475)*** (2.577)*** (2.254)*** (1.851)***
Polynomial order 0 1 3 1 1 1
Bandwidth (years) ∞ ∞ ∞ 2 ∞ ∞
BD-RDD No No No No Yes No
Control variables No No No No No Yes
Observations 9734 9734 9734 5382 19460 9734
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.06
B. Border threshold
Treatment effect 13.902 13.622 15.496 12.538 11.750 12.039
(1.646)*** (2.988)*** (9.530) (6.037)** (3.096)*** (2.493)***
Polynomial order 0 1 3 1 1 1
Bandwidth (minutes) ∞ ∞ ∞ 30 ∞ ∞
BD-RDD No No No No Yes No
Control variables No No No No No Yes
Observations 13296 13296 13296 5762 25341 13296
R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.08
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on age and distance to border). * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%. BD-RDD refers to model (3) that uses information on the period before REBP to control for pre-existing discontinuities at
the age and border threshold.
Source: Own calculations, based on ASSD.
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Table 3: Women: The effect of extending benefit duration into early retirement
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Age threshold
Treatment effect 68.158 109.645 125.716 121.830 109.338 102.584
(6.317)*** (4.927)*** (4.873)*** (4.786)*** (5.292)*** (4.270)***
Polynomial order 0 1 3 1 1 1
Bandwidth (years) ∞ ∞ ∞ 2 ∞ ∞
BD-RDD No No No No Yes No
Control variables No No No No No Yes
Observations 5659 5659 5659 3436 9911 5659
R2 0.14 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.26
B. Border threshold
Treatment effect 62.554 50.580 46.356 43.324 54.046 44.856
(2.973)*** (6.031)*** (15.793)*** (10.136)*** (5.929)*** (5.423)***
Polynomial order 0 1 3 1 1 1
Bandwidth (minutes) ∞ ∞ ∞ 30 ∞ ∞
BD-RDD No No No No Yes No
Control variables No No No No No Yes
Observations 7091 7091 7091 3643 11497 7091
R2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.20 0.20
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on age and distance to border). * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%. BD-RDD refers to model (3) that uses information on the period before REBP to control for pre-existing discontinuities at
the age and border threshold.
Source: Own calculations, based on ASSD.
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